Volume 2, Issue 1, February 2017, Page: 39-44
Mitigating Agency Conflict: A Systematic Review of Literature on Governance Mechanisms
Agyemang Badu Ebenezer, Department of Business Administration, School of Business and Economics, Presbyterian University College, Abetifi, Ghana
Received: Nov. 29, 2016;       Accepted: Feb. 13, 2017;       Published: Mar. 2, 2017
DOI: 10.11648/j.ijafrm.20170201.16      View  1241      Downloads  57
Abstract
The concern of this paper is to systematically review prior literature and to contribute significantly to the understanding of governance mechanisms in resolving agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Using systematic literature approach, this study presents 123 articles published within 1978-2014 in scholarly articles. The review modified the procedure adopted by [1] and [19]. The results observe that significant body of knowledge on mechanisms to resolve agency conflict exists from different theoretical perspectives. However, combinations of mechanisms and circumstances under which they become effective are yet to be thoroughly explored. This paper attempts to fully understand systematically the effectiveness of governance mechanisms from different theoretical perspectives geared towards resolving agency conflict.
Keywords
Systematic Literature, Positivist Stream, Principal Agent Stream, Internal Mechanism, External Mechanism
To cite this article
Agyemang Badu Ebenezer, Mitigating Agency Conflict: A Systematic Review of Literature on Governance Mechanisms, International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management. Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017, pp. 39-44. doi: 10.11648/j.ijafrm.20170201.16
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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